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A REPORT ON THE ELI CIVIL PROCEDURE PROJECT

Developing
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES
FOR EUROPEAN COURTS

BY GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR.

ELI

is the European Law Institute.
Its Secretariat is based in
Vienna, Austria; its members
include judges, lawyers, law professors,
ministry of justice officials, and law firms
from the European Community. It is
substantially modeled on the American
Law Institute, but its wider range of
membership, particularly government
lawyers ex officio, means that ELI has something of a quasi-governmental standing.
ELI is currently engaged in a number of
interesting law reform projects in such
areas as consumer protection law, insolvency law, and contract law. The aim is
to formulate laws and codes that could be
adopted in member states, thus contributing to the harmonization of law among the
European countries.
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Among ELI’s projects is developing a
set of rules, or code, of civil procedure. The
project has been underway for about three
years and has made substantial progress. At
this stage, its conclusions are only tentative
and its specific provisions will be reconsidered in light of the whole set.
Among the important issues are — no
surprise to U.S. law people — jurisdiction
over foreign parties, notice requirements,
pleading, and joinder of claims. Most sensitive — again no surprise — is the question
of pretrial discovery, including depositions
and production of documents. Indeed, the
subject is so sensitive that in the ELI project the process is called “access to evidence”
rather than “discovery.” (The matter of
discovery/access is further discussed below.)
THE TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The ELI Civil Procedure project has
had a head start by reason of an earlier
project, the Principles of Transnational
Procedure and accompanying rules.
See ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure
(Cambridge U. Press, 2006). The Principles
and Rules have been taken by ELI as the
framework for its project.
The Transnational Rules project
was cosponsored by the American
Law Institute (ALI) and UNIDROIT.
“UNIDROIT” is the French acronym
for the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law. UNIDROIT
was established in 1923 as a part of the
League of Nations apparatus and has its
headquarters in Rome. It has a long and
positive provenance although a relatively
modest record in model legislation.
The Transnational Rules project
began as an idea developed by Prof.
Michele Taruffo, an Italian law professor specializing in comparative law,
and myself, then winding down my
term as ALI Director. Taruffo, whose
background is in civil law, and I, with
a background in common law, had
done several studies together. This led
us to believe that, contrary to conventional legal opinion, the civil law and
common-law systems could be integrated. We spent a year working together
to develop a skeletal version of such a
system. Armed with resulting confidence,
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we obtained approval from ALI to propose a
joint venture to UNIDROIT.
UNIDROIT engaged Prof. Rolf Sturner
of Freiburg University in Germany to evaluate the proposal. Sturner’s career involved
being a judge as well as a distinguished
professor of law. Sturner had done important work in comparative procedure, including a project with Peter Murray of Harvard
comparing German civil procedure with its
U.S. counterpart. Sturner made a positive
evaluation of the proposed project and later
joined the project team as a Co-Reporter.
Also joining the team as Associate Reporter
was Prof. Antonio Gidi, who was trained
in Brazil’s civil-law system and teaches
comparative law in the U.S.
The Transnational Rules project had
an ALI advisory committee that included
judges, lawyers, and legal academics.
The legal academics notably included
Professors Mary Kay Kane of the University
of California, Hastings, a coauthor of a
leading treatise on U.S. federal procedure,
and Edward Cooper of the University
of Michigan, who was Reporter for the
Civil Rules subcommittee of the Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.

“

AMONG THE IMPORTANT
ISSUES ARE JURISDICTION
OVER FOREIGN PARTIES,
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS,
PLEADING, and JOINDER
OF CLAIMS. MOST
SENSITIVE IS THE QUESTION
of PRETRIAL DISCOVERY,
INCLUDING DEPOSITIONS
and PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS.
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UNIDROIT appointed a parallel
working group that included specialists
from England, France, Argentina, and
Japan. Notable among the members of
the working group were Justice Aida
Kemelmayer de Carlucci, an appellate
judge in Argentina, Prof. Neil Andrews
of Cambridge University in the U.K., and
Prof. Frederique Ferrand of Jean Moulin
University in Lyon, France. Ferrand is
completely versed not only in French law
but also in German civil procedure.
The Transnational Rules project was not
targeted at any particular audience, thereby
to avoid people who thought the idea of
integrating civil and common-law systems
was a pipedream. The discussions in both
ALI and UNIDROIT groups “proceeded
without the elaborate introductions often
typical in international deliberations.
On the contrary, discussion was simple,
direct, professional, and sympathetic.”
ALI/UNIDROIT, supra, at p. xliv. During
the drafting process, working texts were
disseminated to various legal scholars, some
of whom expressed the usual doubts. At the
conclusion of the drafting stage, in both
English and French, the project conducted
roadshows around the world. Those attending these sessions included legal scholars,
judges, and practitioners from about
15 countries, including China, Russia,
Brazil, and Australia.
The Transnational Rules project was
completed in 2004. In the intervening
years the Principles and Rules attracted
attention primarily in academic circles
and some in international arbitration.
See Bibliography, in ALI/UNIDROIT,
supra, at pp. 157 et seq. No national
regime adopted them. However, the
transnational formulations were widely
available and had attracted no substantial
negative attention.
The transnational texts have proved
very useful in the ELI project. Several
members of the transnational team are
now engaged in the ELI enterprise,
including Professors Sturner, Andrews,
and Ferrand.
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
It is worth reviewing the differences
and similarities between, on the one
hand, the Transnational Rules and
4
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the emergent ELI formulations, and, on
the other hand, the counterpart rules of
civil-law systems and the American model
epitomized in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP). Notable differences are:
jury trial, the roles of judges and lawyers,
and the scope of appellate review.
No European civil procedural system
uses juries, although some of them have lay
arbiters in labor court procedure. Although
jury trial in civil cases originated in
England, English courts over a century ago
ceased using juries except in a very limited
category of cases. The Transnational Rules
proceed on the premise that they can work
equally well under a jury system. Rule 23.2
of the Transnational Rules requires:
The judgment should be accompanied
by a reasoned explanation of the essential factual, legal, and evidentiary basis
of the decision.
The accompanying comment states that
compliance with this rule can be achieved
by reference to “the transcript of the
instructions to the jury.”
REGARDING THE ROLE OF JUDGES
AND LAWYERS, a distinction is
traditionally drawn between “inquisitorial” civil-law systems and “adversarial”

					
common-law systems. This distinction
is becoming more formal than actual.
In England, the judges now have very
substantial authority to manage civil
cases, particularly in complex litigation.
The same is true in the U.S. federal
system, as expressed in FRCP 16 (pretrial
conferences) and FRCP 26 (discovery).
Many state systems have similar rules and
some also have specialized courts with
“managerial judges” to handle commercial litigation.
The Transnational Rules address the
roles of both judges and lawyers. Rule 10.1
provides:
A judge . . . must not participate if
there are reasonable grounds to doubt
[his/her] impartiality.
Rules 10.2 and 10.3 go on to provide
that “A party must have the right to make
reasonable challenge of the impartiality of
a judge” and that such a challenge must be
heard by or appealable to a different judge.
Principles 4.1 and 4.2 provide that “a
party [be able] to engage a lawyer of the
party’s choice” and that “a lawyer’s professional independence should be respected.”
The comment to these provisions states
that “lawyers are expected to advocate
the interests of their clients and gener-

“

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT IN
WHICH ONLY the UNITARY SOVEREIGNTY
CLAIM, CIVIL CODE OR COMMON LAW,
HAD BEEN ASSERTED? DOES a
TRANS-EUROPEAN LEGAL CLAIM
SURVIVE? OR SHOULD A
COUNTERPART OF the U.S. RULE
OF CLAIM PRECLUSION APPLY?
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ally to maintain the secrecy of confidences
obtained in the course of representation.”
Rule 27.1 provides that “evidence may
not be elicited in violation of the legalprofession privilege of confidentiality under
forum law [or] confidentiality of communications in settlement negotiations.”
REGARDING THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW, the difference remains
at least formally significant. In the civil
systems an appellate court has plenary
authority to review an inferior court’s
judgment, not only as to issues of law but
also as to issues of fact. The underlying
theory is that the civil code determines
the substantive basis of the case and
that the higher court judges have more
authoritative understanding of the code’s
provisions. The underlying civil-law
theory regarding issues of fact traditionally has been that evidence is a legal
science and that the strength of an item of
evidence is governed by a set of rules. For
example, the probative value of a witness’s
testimony depends on his or her position
in society — whether a professional or
merely a worker. These evidentiary rules,
like the substantive law of the civil code,
are therefore more authoritatively understood by higher level judges.
In common-law systems the appellate
court reviews for “error” in jury-tried cases
and “abuse of discretion” in most judgetried cases. The deference to jury findings
derives from the constitutional basis of
the jury trial itself. The deference to trial
court findings in judge-tried cases reflects
recognition that the trial judge has had
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses.
It would appear that the civil-law system
makes appeals relatively attractive; I have
heard some lawyers in civil systems say
that the proceeding in the first-instance
court is actually a preliminary hearing.
Moreover, common-law systems include
the concept of “harmless error,” so that
establishing that the trial court committed a mistake does not necessarily make
for a successful appeal.
In light of these complications, the
comment to Rule 33 states that in general
“appellate review should be through the
procedures available in the court system of
the forum.”
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Some differences between civil-law and
common-law systems are of low visibility.
In the matter of notice, for example, it was
interesting to learn that in Germany and
perhaps some other European countries,
notice to defendants is ordinarily given
electronically, whereas in our systems the
old-fashioned manual service of summons
is the default rule and is still used in most
cases. The Transnational Rules recognize
that there are differences in notice procedure and adopt the forum’s procedure
subject to specified requirements. Rule
7.1 provides:
A party must be given formal notice in
accordance with forum law by means
reasonably likely to be effective.
Rule 7.2 goes on to require that notice
be in the target’s language and include
the statement of claim and specify the
time to respond.
A more visible difference is that in
many civil-law systems, and in English
high courts, the advocates wear black robes,
signifying a judicious role similar to the
judicial role. The Transnational Rules leave
that subject alone.
JOINDER, PLEADING, RES
JUDICATA
Three other low-visibility differences are
interrelated: the joinder of claims in a civil
action; the pleading of multiple theories of
liability; and the scope of res judicata upon
conclusion of a civil action. Understanding
these issues requires reference to the underlying substantive law in contemporary
civil-law systems.
The substantive law in civil-law
systems historically is expressed in
comprehensive civil codes, patterned on
the Napoleonic Code that was adopted in
France at the turn of the 19th Century.
The civil-law theory is that law is exclusively expressed in the codes, and that
other legal sources, including judicial
opinions, are on a lesser footing.
UNITARY OR DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
This civil-law premise is based on the
unitary sovereignty that is established in
the national state in which a civil code has
been adopted. From different historical

origins, the United Kingdom of England
and Wales (thus not including Scotland)
also has a unitary sovereignty.
In contrast, the American federal
system involves dual sovereignty: A
supreme but subject-matter limited
national authority, founded in the
Constitution, and a residual plenary
authority in the states, formally recognized in the Tenth Amendment. Among
other things, the U.S. dual-sovereignty
system has resulted in a major law-making role for the judiciary, centered in the
Supreme Court. It is generally the courts
that authoritatively determine the boundaries between national and state authority.
Because the boundaries have changed
over time and have always been gray areas
rather than strict lines, American law on
the subject has always been complicated.
In a dual-sovereignty system, advocates
on both sides in a civil case must consider
whether both federal and state substantive
law may afford at least arguable rights and
defenses. For example, a claim of invasion
of privacy may be available under the U.S.
Constitution and under a state constitution or statute. So also law regulating
the environment may emanate from both
federal and state statutes. Attention may
also be required to differences in procedure in federal and state courts where
those courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
American lawyers and judges therefore
have long functioned in a very complicated legal system.
What has been emerging in Europe
over recent decades is a similar if narrower
dual sovereignty. This is a product of a
trans-European body of higher “constitutional” law, propounded by the courts in
interpreting basic European treaties. As
this body of law has gradually accumulated, it creates increasing possibilities
that a given event or transaction in a
European system can be subject to both
the traditional civil code or common
law (in England) and the limited but
supreme reach of trans-European law.
These possibilities invite claimants to
propound multiple claims based on multiple substantive theories; defendants have
similar leeway in affirmative defenses.
These possibilities require recognition
of a right to plead alternative theories
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and to join multiple claims, and may
also affect joinder of parties. Accordingly,
Transnational Rule 12.4 provides that “a
party who is justifiably uncertain of a fact
or legal grounds may make statements
about them in the alternative.”
There is a correlative res judicata
question: What is the effect of a judgment
in which only the unitary sovereignty
claim, civil code or common law, had been
asserted? Does a trans-European legal claim
survive? Or should a counterpart of the
U.S. rule of claim preclusion apply? Many
European jurists and lawyers have been
puzzled by these possibilities, given their
professional acculturation in systems of
unitary national sovereignty. The subject of
res judicata is outside the scope of typical
procedural codes. At any rate, the U.S. rule
is that if the two claims arose out of the
same event or transaction, then generally both must be asserted in the original
action, on pain of preclusion in subsequent
litigation. See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24.
JURY, DISCOVERY AND ROLES OF
LAWYER AND JUDGES
The differences between European and
American systems are more evident in the
procedure for determining facts; in “access
to evidence” a.k.a “discovery”; and in the
roles of lawyers and judges. These differences are correlated with each other.
Jury Trial
The basic American procedure for determining facts is of course jury trial. Jury trial is
a right largely determined by constitutional
provisions — the Seventh Amendment in
the federal system and similar provisions
in state constitutions. Moreover, the right
to jury trial has wide popular support, such
that it is virtually impossible for it to be
repealed. In contrast, civil-law systems have
never had general use of juries. As noted
earlier, England, although historically a
common-law jurisdiction, has long since
discarded the jury role in all but narrow
categories of civil litigation.
The practical importance of jury trial is
not that there are so many jury trials — the
“vanishing jury” is much talked about. In
most American jurisdictions jury trials are
actually held in less than five percent of
4
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civil cases filed. Accordingly, it should be
recognized that in American civil litigation
the significance of jury trial is rather the
prospect of jury trial that hovers over most
civil cases. The possibility of jury trial is
especially menacing to corporate defendants whose conduct could be considered as
overreach according to popular concepts of
right and wrong.
Broad Discovery
The broad discovery afforded in FRCP
26–37, and its state law counterparts, is
justified in important part as a means of
assembling evidence before trial for eventual presentation to a jury. Any particular
jury is assembled ad hoc, sits through a
single continuous trial session, and then is
dissolved. It is therefore generally impractical to have a jury function in sequential
sessions. Accordingly, all evidence for trial
must be assembled before trial. Before
modern pretrial discovery exemplified in
the FRCP, the adversaries typically had
to guess what the opposing party’s proof
would be. Under modern discovery, that
proof can be fully exposed before trial.
Roles of Judges and Lawyers
Theoretically, assembly of the evidence
could be assigned to judges. However, this
would be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition that a litigant is entitled
to assistance of a lawyer. Proper legal
assistance in the common-law tradition
includes fashioning legal claims and
pursuing evidence relevant to those claims.
Discovery obtained by the advocates serves
these purposes.
Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is helpful and often
essential in much modern litigation. An
important issue is selection of the experts.
In most common-law jurisdictions, and
in the U.S., each party may select its
experts, taking into account their stature
in the field, their effectiveness as a witness,
and their availability. In most civil-law
systems, engaging experts is in the court’s
discretion and the selection is up to the
judge. Typically, when expert testimony is
regarded as necessary, the judge will confer
with a convenient university or specialized
source to identify a suitable expert.

					
The advocate’s role also includes a
discerning assessment of the quality of the
evidence. This too is furthered by pretrial
discovery. For example, an important
question is whether, in the estimate of the
advocates for the parties, a key witness is
reasonably articulate and can hold up under
cross examination at trial. Discovery depositions afford a preview of that issue. In the
present era of electronic communication,
a decisive issue can be whether key email
documents — damaging or protective —
are available. Pretrial discovery can resolve
that issue.
Discovery depositions and documents
discovery ordinarily are almost entirely
the responsibility of the lawyers. FRCP
16 confers broad authority on the judge
to provide case management. In practice,
however, most of the scheduling and
calendaring is done by agreements of
the lawyers that are ratified in orders by
the judges. Indeed, the broad discovery
enabled by FRCP 26–37 is possible only
because it is conducted primarily by the
advocates. Under typical judicial staffing
in the American system, caseloads are such
that the judges do not have time, or inclination, to pursue extended case management. There has been growing pressure
for greater judicial involvement, but in
practice substantial judicial involvement
typically will focus on complex cases.
In any event, broad pretrial discovery of course is not an unmixed blessing.
Wide-ranging advocate-driven discovery
is notoriously considered a curse by many
in the legal fraternity. Efforts continue
to devise practical limitations, such as
conferring broad powers on the judge to
limit discovery, as in FRCP 26(b)(2), and
imposing tight limits on the number and
duration of depositions, as in many state
civil procedure rules. The discovery system
also generates the need for advocates who
can maintain a balance between being civil
and being zealous.
Broad discovery is regarded with horror
by most European lawyers, judges, and
government officials. Their conception of
U.S. discovery is anecdotal, responsive to
aggressive efforts by American lawyers to
obtain evidence from European sources. At
the same time, sober assessments of access to
justice recognize that there is often unequal
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access to evidence, particularly in litigation
between individuals and organizations.
A type of “discovery” is the rule governing pleading. American lawyers are well
aware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009). These decisions tightened the
requirements of FRCP 8, if in uncertain
degree, but they clearly require specificity
in key factual allegations.
The pleading requirements in the
Transnational Rules entail substantially
greater “discovery.” Rule 12.1 provides:
The plaintiff must state the facts on which
the claim is based, [and] describe the
evidence to support those statements . . .
Rule 12.3 provides:
The statement of facts must, so far as
reasonably practicable, set forth detail as
to time, place, participants, and events.
Rule 13.4 imposes the same requirements on defendants in an answer, affirmative defense, and counterclaim.
The Transnational Rules make carefully
guarded provisions for further disclosure
of evidence, with emphasis on the role of
the judge.
Rules 21–21.1.2 require that a party
“identify to the court and other parties
the evidence on which the party intends
to rely, including . . . copies of documents
. . . [and] summaries of expected testimony
of witnesses, including experts.” Rule
21.2 requires updating the disclosures if
additional items are to be used. Rule 21.3
addresses a matter that is very sensitive in
most European systems: “A lawyer for a
party may have a voluntary interview with
a potential nonparty witness. The interview may be on reasonable notice to other
parties, who may be permitted to attend
the interview.”
Rule 22.1 gives the court broad authority to order additional disclosure:
A party may request the court to
order production by any person of any
evidentiary matter, not protected by
confidentiality or privilege, that is
relevant to the case and that may be
admissible, including . . . documents
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. . . persons having knowledge of a
matter in issue . . . [and] the report of
any expert that another party intends
to present.”

63

“

The foregoing authority would empower
a court to order pretrial disclosure virtually
as broad as the U.S. rules in FRCP 26–37.
Given the European tradition, however, it
is quite unlikely that any such order would
be issued or, if issued, sustained on appeal.
Pretrial Motions
All legal systems provide for activities
prior to final hearing. In civil-law systems,
cases usually proceed in a sequence of
short hearings. These hearings can address
preliminary objections, such as a challenge
to jurisdiction, or issues on the merits, or
consideration of evidence. In commonlaw systems similar sessions are called
pretrial hearings, and the matters typically
are addressed through motions. Pretrial
motions can address procedural matters,
such as scheduling of depositions, and
substantive matters.
The classic substantive motion is the
motion to dismiss, originally called the
general demurrer in common-law systems.
A motion to dismiss addresses the text of
the complaint (or an affirmative defense),
and contends that, even if the allegations
are eventually proved through evidence,
they do not constitute a valid basis for
a claim. But the demurrer or motion to
dismiss does not address potential evidence.
Accordingly, in classic common law, any
examination of evidence had to await trial.
Under modern procedure the court
has comprehensive authority to deal with
matters prior to plenary trial. American
lawyers are familiar with FRCP 16,
governing pretrial procedure, and Rule
26 governing discovery in particular.
Transnational Rules 18–18.7, entitled
“Case Management,” require the court to
“assume active management of the proceeding in all stages of the litigation.” To do so,
a judge may:
• set “a planning conference early in the
proceeding” (Rule 18.2)
• “suggest amendment of the pleadings”
(Rule 18.3.1)

BROAD DISCOVERY IS REGARDED
with HORROR BY MOST EUROPEAN
LAWYERS, JUDGES, and GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS. THEIR CONCEPTION of
U.S. DISCOVERY IS ANECDOTAL,
RESPONSIVE TO AGGRESSIVE
EFFORTS BY AMERICAN LAWYERS
TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE FROM
EUROPEAN SOURCES.

• “order [a] separate hearing of one or
more issues” (Rule 18.3.2)
• “make decisions concerning admissibility and exclusion of evidence” (Rule
18.3.4)
• “order any person subject to the court’s
authority to produce documents or
other evidence” (Rule 18.3.5)
Summary Judgment
In combination the foregoing powers
authorize what is known in common-law
procedure as the motion for summary judgment. That motion is key in common-law
systems, particularly in the U.S. with its
right of jury trial.
The motion for summary judgment
was invented in late 19th-century English
procedure. It allowed a motion to dismiss
not only to address an opposed pleading
but also to be supported by evidence,
particularly relevant documents and affidavits by witnesses. Originally the summary
judgment motion could be brought only
in suits to collect on promissory notes.
Over the years the motion was adopted
in the U.S. and its scope enlarged. In the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted
in 1938 the motion was made available in
any kind of case. It is now officially called
a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
but in practice it is still called the motion
for summary judgment. It has become the
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most important pretrial motion and the
most important event in civil litigation
except trial itself.
The prospect of jury trial is the driving
force in motions for, and in resistance to,
summary judgment. The essential issue
posed by the motion is whether there is
enough admissible evidence to send the
case to a jury. If there is not such evidence
in the judge’s estimate, then according
to FRCP 56 there should be a “judgment
according to law” for the moving party. The
procedure builds on the long-established rule
concerning a motion for a directed verdict.
That motion, made a trial, authorizes the
judge to preempt a jury verdict if the judge
determines that the evidence is insufficient
to permit the jury to make a reasonable decision against the party making the motion.
The motion for summary judgment
advances the issue of sufficiency of evidence
to the pretrial stage. Many lawyers and law
teachers consider that the combination of
FRCP 26–37 (discovery) and 56 (summary
judgment) is what most modern contested
cases are about. To be sure, not all of the 95
percent or so of civil cases resolved without
trial are determined by summary judgment.
Indeed probably less than half of those cases
have involved a summary judgment motion;
the available statistics are not refined enough
to say. Nevertheless, a judge’s decision on a
summary judgment motion can grant it in 4
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part, overrule it with skeptical comment,
or otherwise express an opinion about the
evidence. The lawyers will pay close attention and adjust their assessment of settlement possibilities.
The procedure involved in summary
judgment is functionally similar to the
procedure in a civil-law sequence of court
determinations: First, statements of claim
in the pleadings; second, assembly of
evidence, through discovery (common law)
or directions of the court (civil law); third,
decision short of final plenary hearing.
THE TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The key provisions in the Transnational
Principles and Rules of Civil Procedure are:
• Notice to a defendant should be
according to the regular procedure of
the first-instance court, but if defendant resides elsewhere then additional
notice would be appropriate.

					
• Interlocutory procedures for securing an eventual judgment, such as
attachment, should be according to the
forum’s rules.
• The first-instance court should be
active in managing the litigation.
• Joinder of claims and parties should
be liberally allowed. Attention should
be paid to the correlative rule of res
judicata.
• The parties should append to their
pleadings copies of documents and
sworn declarations of witnesses they
expect to rely on.
• Limited discovery should be afforded,
broader than typical European systems
but more limited than in the U.S.
• The parties should be allowed to present expert witnesses that they engage,
rather than being limited to experts
appointed by the court.
• The finder of fact should give a written
explanation of its determination.
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• Appellate review should be conducted
according to the forum’s regular appellate procedure.
The European Law Institute is proceeding in light of these proposals. Its work has
only begun and will culminate in its own
determinations. However, it is a reasonable forecast that the final product will be
substantially similar to the Transnational
Principles and Rules.
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